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In 2001, the Finnish Parliament approved the plan for a high-level nuclear waste 
(HLW) repository in Finland, the first move of its kind worldwide. This article 
analyzes the historical background of radioactive waste policy formation in Finland, 
comparing it to that of (West) Germany in the Cold War context and after. Military 
ambitions and non-proliferation, political culture and civil society, and energy 
policy are considered. In Germany, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which 
could make nuclear armament possible, was pursued until 1989 and often spurred 
opposition movements. Finland, in contrast, renounced reprocessing around 
1980. In addition, there was a notable absence of a strong nationwide anti-nuclear 
movement in Finland against the backdrop of the Cold War.
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Introduction
Finland is a highly advanced country in the field of nuclear power. Even since the 
Fukushima disaster in Japan on March 11, 2011, it has made no major changes 
to its nuclear power promotion policy. In 2001, the Finnish Parliament approved 
a repository plan for high-level nuclear waste (HLW) in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki 
municipality, in the country’s southwest. This was the first such plan in the world, 
as countries utilizing nuclear power have encountered difficulties selecting a site 
for “final disposal” that would totally isolate the harmful HLW generated during 
the sustained operation of a nuclear power plant (NPP).
Clarifying why Finland was able to settle on a final disposal site when 
almost all other countries have failed to do so could contribute to resolving this 
issue. This issue has attracted worldwide attention and many studies have been 
published on this subject (e.g. OECD and NEA 2002; Kojo 2009).
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There are three main methods for HLW disposal: direct disposal, 
reprocessing, and transportation to other countries. Of these three, Finland has 
adopted the direct disposal approach. As is well known, the nuclear fuel cycle 
concept outlines how spent nuclear fuel (SNF) may be reprocessed after being 
used in NPPs; uranium and plutonium are extracted and then used as fuel again, 
improving energy self-sufficiency. Why then has Finland adopted direct disposal 
when it possesses few fossil fuel resources? What is the historical background? 
The analysis in this article refers to the study of Högselius (2009). As a reference 
case, this analysis will compare Finland to Germany, which was the first nation 
to decide to phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. Germany 
failed to pursue reprocessing, halted its initial practice of consigning waste to the 
United Kingdom and France, and now aims to conduct direct disposal. Nuclear 
waste has been a source of conflict in Germany for decades.
The difference in nuclear waste management between these two countries 
could already be observed at the start of the twenty-first century. Finland decided 
upon a final disposal site in 2001 and decided to construct a fifth NPP in 2002, 
the first to do so in Western Europe since the Chernobyl disaster. In contrast, 
Germany decided to phase out NPPs in 2000, with a set operation period of 
thirty-two years per reactor. In the agreement in 2000, a moratorium on the 
planned repository, Gorleben, was also agreed upon. In the aftermath, the 
exploration of Gorleben to clarify conceptual and safety issues was suspended for 
a minimum of three to a maximum of ten years.
Both Finland and Germany were defeated in devastating wars in the 
1940s—Finland by the Soviet Union in the Winter War (1939–1940) and the 
Continuation War (1941–1944), and Germany by the Allies in World War II. Both 
nations recovered economically and are currently democratic and technologically 
advanced, and do not need to worry about disasters such as earthquakes that 
could threaten plant operation and final disposal sites. Why, then, does Finland 
continue to use nuclear power with an agreed-upon disposal site for high-level 
radioactive waste, while Germany is phasing out NPPs and no disposal site for 
radioactive waste has been designated? Despite its cultural and geographical 
proximity to Germany, Finland does not show any sign of changing its nuclear 
policy after Fukushima and the German phase-out decision (Hakkarainen and 
Fjaestad 2012; Fjaestad and Hakkarainen 2013). Disposal of harmful radioactive 
waste has often been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear power efforts—an 
“Achilles heel” for nuclear applications. Proper disposal of radioactive waste is a 
necessary part of the basis for nuclear applications. Therefore, this article focuses 
on the process of setting a radioactive waste disposal site in Finland and why no 
such site was selected in Germany. It also describes the historical background: 
why direct disposal was chosen in Finland while reprocessing was sought and 
abandoned in Germany, with a change to direct disposal.
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Definition of Terms and Analytical Framework
Definition of Terms
Beyond the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s general framework 
concerning “radioactive waste,” the actual detailed definition of types of waste 
and protocols for dealing with waste are controlled at the national level and there 
are various standards. “High-level radioactive waste” (HLW) is roughly classified 
as follows: in countries that adopt “direct disposal” to dispose of SNF, that SNF 
is classified as HLW; on the other hand, in countries that reprocess uranium and 
plutonium from SNF, the remaining waste is classified as HLW. Since Finland has 
adopted direct disposal, its SNF is classified as HLW. On the other hand, given 
that Germany entrusted its reprocessing to the United Kingdom and France 
through 2005 and it is presently re-receiving the waste after reprocessing, the 
nation possesses and has to deal with both SNF and the waste remaining after 
reprocessing. In this article, the term “HLW” is applied in the cases of both 
countries for nuclear waste that emits particularly strong radiation, regardless of 
the method by which it is handled. In addition, only nuclear waste from NPPs is 
covered here.
Currently, the best way to handle HLW is considered to be deep burial after 
cooling, where it will be completely isolated from the human environment for 
thousands to tens of thousands of years until it is detoxified. In practice, the HLW 
dealt with here is spent nuclear fuel in Finland and both SNF and waste liquid 
after reprocessing in Germany; these are strictly different, but can be treated in 
common here as both need a place to be stored for several tens of thousands of 
years, deep in the earth, generally speaking in the home country; and people 
generally tend to be repelled because of the danger. Also, using the term “HLW” 
can help abstract the problem and smooth out the discussion without getting 
caught up on presently irrelevant details.
Analytical Framework
Högselius (2009) suggests five factors by which we can analyze the reasons that 
SNF disposal methods differ between countries: military ambition, technical 
culture, political culture and civil society, geological situation, and energy policies. 
However, as he stated himself, these are meant to cover global policy and need 
adjustment. For this reason, this article focuses on military ambition, political 
culture and civil society, and energy policy. Technical culture is also an interesting 
theme, but it cannot be addressed here because of the importance of diplomacy 
for both defeated countries, the international political situation effected by the 
Cold War, and length constraints on the present article. In addition, since both 
countries basically have stable rock underneath, geological conditions need not 
be addressed here.
In the following section, the general energy policy situations are discussed; 
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after that, the foreign policy and domestic politics are compared.
Comparative Analysis of the Two Countries
General Energy Policy Situation
Finland has 5.379 million people in 338 thousand square kilometers of land and 
few fossil fuel resources. Because of rapid industrialization and urbanization after 
World War II, it has been said that Finland transformed from an agricultural 
to an industrialized country from the 1950s to the 1970s. In particular, 
industrialization took the form of development in the field of forestry. Pulp 
factories required considerable amounts of energy and this encouraged the use of 
water resources for energy production and the construction of NPPs (Konttinen 
1999, 22).
There are two units each operating in Loviisa and Olkiluoto—altogether 
four nuclear reactors that provide about 30 percent of the nation’s total electricity. 
Furthermore, the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR), which will be the 
fifth domestic reactor in Finland, is under construction in Olkiluoto. In addition, 
another is planned for the Hanhikivi Peninsula in the municipality of Pyhäjoki. 
It must also be added that the former Soviet Union NPPs at Loviisa have been 
improved and are still operating.
In the Finnish Parliament, the Green League (Vihreä liitto) is the only party 
against the expansion of nuclear power. Many voters tend not to consider nuclear 
power to be an important issue. Only minor problems concerning nuclear 
technology have occurred so far in Finland. However, after the Fukushima 
disaster, demonstrations with hundreds of participants occurred, particularly in 
the capital (Libermann 2011). In the end, the Fukushima accident did not receive 
much political attention, even though it happened during the Finnish election 
campaign. With regard to Germany’s decision to quit nuclear power, there were 
concerns about the potential impact of rising electricity prices in the European 
market and their implications for Finland. Besides, nuclear power could possibly 
be replaced by fossil fuels, impacting negatively the European goal of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions to counter climate change (Hakkarainen and Fjaestad 
2012, 237-240; Fjaestad and Hakkarainen 2013, 3-4). Most Finns trust that their 
own nuclear power plants are totally safe (Libermann 2011).
Finland relies on coal and gas imports for most of its energy. Approximately 
66 percent of coal is imported from Russia, and the remainder comes from 
Poland; all gas comes from Russia. Approximately 7 billion euros a year is paid 
for imports that account for two-thirds of total energy, and two-thirds of these 
imports come from Russia (World Nuclear Association 2018b). Finland has 
sought to become energy self-sufficient in order to stop relying on imports from 
the Soviet Union/Russia. According to the government’s energy strategy, nuclear 
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energy is valued as a source that does not emit greenhouse gases.
Germany holds 80.79 million people in 357 thousand square kilometers of 
land. It has substantial domestic coal mining operations, but nuclear power has 
been promoted since the oil crises of the 1970s. After the Chernobyl disaster in 
1986, momentum for phasing out nuclear power increased and a transition to 
natural energy was promoted. In contrast to Finland, the Fukushima disaster had 
a big impact on Germany. Before the disaster, the German government already 
had a plan to halt the nuclear power phase out.1 However, after the disaster, the 
focus shifted to the “Ethics Committee for Safe Energy Supply,” a discussion 
forum between nuclear supporters and opponents. Based on its outcomes, the 
government decided upon a new policy to immediately shut down all seventeen 
NPPs by 2022. In the committee report, it was pointed out that the question of 
the costs of phasing out nuclear energy also need to be compared to the costs 
of coping with a nuclear accident such as that currently occurring in Japan: all 
of these costs would exceed the anticipated costs that would be attributable to 
Germany’s energy transition (Ethik‐Kommission Sichere Energieversorgung 
2011, 24). In the local parliamentary (Landtag) elections in 2011, the Green Party 
advanced, and in the state (Land) of Baden-Württemberg, a Green politician took 
office as minister-president (Ministerpräsident) for the first time. At that time, 
there were anti-nuclear protests, the size of which is said to have ranged from the 
tens of thousands up to 250,000 participants (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2011).
Before the disaster, Germany had obtained about 25 percent of its total 
electricity from its seventeen NPPs. Currently, about 12 percent of its electricity is 
supplied by seven reactors (World Nuclear Association 2018a). At present, there 
are few politicians advocating for nuclear power in Germany. About 40 percent 
of its energy sources are coal (about 23 percent is brown coal), 13 percent natural 
gas, 1 percent petroleum products, and 30 percent renewable energy (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2017). Approximately one-third of the oil and natural gas is imported 
from Russia (Zeit Online 2014), but Germany is not as dependent on that one 
country as Finland is.
Military Ambitions and Non-Proliferation
“A first important factor that has influenced countries’ SNF strategies has 
historically been their varying ambitions with respect to nuclear weapons. Most 
nuclear weapons countries have seen it as a necessity to build up a competence 
within the field of reprocessing, since reprocessing is the only known way to 
produce plutonium” (Högselius 2009, 256).
After the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union 
conducted nuclear tests in 1949, followed by Britain in 1952, France in 1960, and 
China in 1964. In 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) was signed to prevent countries other than these five nuclear weapon 
states from developing or possessing nuclear weapons. These countries decided 
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not to support the development of nuclear weapons in countries that did not then 
have nuclear weapons, while countries that did not possess nuclear weapons and 
joined the treaty agreed not to produce nuclear weapons. In return, they were 
guaranteed the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
In this respect, Germany and Finland do not possess their own nuclear 
weapons (at least publicly), but there are slight differences in the circumstances 
surrounding reprocessing that may be related to nuclear proliferation.
The Finnish people were consistently concerned about Soviet encroachment 
against a historical background. The Soviet Union attacked and occupied many 
small countries. Since Finland shares a border with this country, it was also 
exposed to the threat of Soviet invasion.
After Finland was defeated by the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939-
1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-1944, a severe truce agreement was 
signed in September 1944. The Finnish people were in dire need at the time, but 
in order not to worsen its relationship with the Soviet Union, Finland declined 
the U.S. reconstruction assistance plan, the “Marshall Plan,” announced in 1947.
In April 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (the “YYA Treaty”). In the 
YYA Treaty, it is stipulated that if Finland is targeted as a transit country for an 
invasion of the Soviet Union, Finland will fight to repel the invaders.
When Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union, it received little security aid 
from other countries. Against this historical backdrop, Finnish president Juho 
Kusti Paasikivi (in office 1946-1956) adopted a neutral policy based on a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union, and his successor, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen 
(1956-1982), did the same.
Because of the YYA Treaty, however, Finland was exposed to the danger 
of having its internal affairs meddled in by the Soviet Union.2 Finland did not 
join the European Community (EC), and became only a partial member of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1961; its formal accession was not 
until 1986. Following the Treaty of Peace with Finland signed between the Allied 
countries, including the Soviet Union and Finland in 1947, armament in Finland 
was limited, and the possession of nuclear weapons, missiles, and submarines 
was prohibited. In 1963, the Nordic Non-Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) 
agreement was proposed by President Kekkonen against European military 
buildup; it was revived in the 1980s (Momose 1989). It presented the Nordic 
states’ desire to avoid inclusion in a Cold War nuclear exchange. Finland had no 
nuclear weapons, so there was no disagreement in Finland over signing the NPT 
among political parties and interest groups (van Dassen 1998, 19-20).
Of course, Finland could not behave freely regarding the civilian use of 
nuclear power. The first nuclear technology in Finland was provided by the 
Soviet Union under pressure, with subsequent technology provided by Sweden 
(Michelsen 2013). Initially, reprocessing was also seen as an option in Finland. 
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However, in 1974, India shocked the world by testing a nuclear explosive made 
with plutonium separated with reprocessing technology. There were concerns 
that nuclear terrorism could become a reality through reprocessing (von Hippel 
2001). After that, the United States began to revise its own nuclear policy, 
abandoned its own nuclear fuel cycle development using reprocessing technology 
and fast breeder reactor technology, and strongly called upon other countries 
to do the same. As Cold War tensions increased, the Soviet Union was keen to 
prevent radioactive waste from falling into the hands of NATO countries and 
vice versa (Suominen 1999, 29). In addition, it became clear that reprocessing 
was considerably more expensive than anticipated. Apart from commissioning 
the disposal of SNF from NPPs in Loviisa by sending it to the Soviet Union for 
processing, Finland gave up on the option of reprocessing, and starting in 1980 
adopted direct disposal in-country. It can be pointed out that there were enough 
reasons why Finland did not choose reprocessing, because it was a sensitive issue 
in the Cold War and would occur considerable costs.
After World War II, unlike Finland, Germany was divided into four zones, 
respectively occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
the Soviet Union. After the establishment of East Germany in 1949, diplomacy 
which emphasized close relations with the United States was conducted by 
West German Chancellor Adenauer. He was also strongly anti-Soviet and anti-
communist (Itabashi 2014, 63–71). Resistance to the reconstruction of West 
Germany was deeply rooted in European sentiment, but economic and military 
restoration of West Germany was nevertheless required because of the priority 
given to the containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
In view of international circumstances such as the North Korean invasion 
of South Korea in 1950 igniting the Korean War and the Soviet Union threats 
to use nuclear weapons against the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis in 
1956, Europe needed West German strength for its defense, and the development 
of nuclear weapons was discussed in West Germany (Schwartz 1983, 35-
61). Nuclear physicists recommended against German nuclear weapons, but 
controversy about reprocessing and nuclear armament continued. Germany 
was at the forefront of the Cold War conflict owing to geographical conditions, 
and many politicians in the CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V.) expressed strong 
opposition to the NPT (Tsuzaki 2019, 187-190; Der Spiegel 1967). The rejection 
of reprocessing technology and fast breeder reactor technology in the United 
States boosted the protests in West Germany against the plan to construct a 
breeder reactor at Kalkar and a reprocessing facility in Gorleben (Radkau and 
Hahn 2013, 304). However, reprocessing was not abandoned, although doubts 
about the economics of it increased. When U.S.-Soviet relations began to become 
tense again around the end of the 1970s, the anti-nuclear movement in West 
Germany became the largest in Western Europe (Takemoto 2017, 190-202). The 
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anti-nuclear and peace movements were linked (Radkau and Hahn 2013, 306-
307). Although protests temporarily calmed down, the largest protests yet were 
observed after the Chernobyl disaster, against the background of a rise in anti-
nuclear public opinion and under the suspicion of diversion of nuclear waste to 
nuclear weapons after reprocessing (Radkau 2011, 371). Ultimately, the dream of 
reprocessing ended in 1989 for economic reasons. Summarizing the above, West 
Germany gave up reprocessing because the relationship with nuclear weapons 
was questioned, the anti-nuclear movement grew after Chernobyl, and the cost of 
reprocessing rose.
Today neither country has its own nuclear weapons. However, partly since 
West Germany had pursued reprocessing, which could lead to nuclear weapons, 
without responding to U.S. calls to give up this practice, public opinion turned 
against nuclear armament, especially after the Chernobyl disaster. On the other 
hand, since Finland abandoned reprocessing around 1980, military use of nuclear 
power was not as controversial as in Germany; as a result, there were no strong 
ties in Finland between the peace movement and anti-nuclear movement as there 
were in Germany.3
Political Culture and Civil Society
The type of political system is a factor that has played a major role in countries’ 
divergent choices on SNF strategies; in particular, strong differences are evident 
between democratic and non-democratic countries. It is obvious that countries 
with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governance structures, such as Russia, 
China, and North Korea, have found it easier to sustain reprocessing-oriented 
strategies in times when these have been subject to heavy criticism in other parts 
of the world (Högselius 2009, 259).
In the Cold War period, Finland exported its SNF to the Soviet Union. “In 
principle, this was a form of political coercion…Two Soviet-designed reactors in 
Finland were also part of this SNF regime up to 1996…The principle of exporting 
SNF to the Soviet Union contributed strongly to an East European nuclear power 
culture in which SNF was never a major issue” (ibid.).
Two perspectives should be proposed here. The first is that Finland and 
East Germany were each part of the SNF regime. The second is that the political 
environment changed because of the end of the Cold War and accession to the 
European Community (EC)/European Union (EU).
In the beginning, Finland was optimistic about the nuclear waste problem 
because of its low population density and adequate space for waste disposal 
(Lidskog and Litmanen 1997, 69; Kojo 2009, 163). In addition, as mentioned 
above, Finland could entrust the disposal of SNF from the NPP in Loviisa to the 
Soviet Union, which introduced that facility. Therefore, Finland did not need to 
take about half of SNF into consideration.
In the early 1980s when Cold War tensions increased further, the anti-
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nuclear and peace movement progressed in Europe with a critical eye on the 
military and civilian use of nuclear technology. In this context, Finland was in a 
rare situation, with domestic NPPs from both the East and West. Many activists 
in the anti-nuclear peace movement hardly opposed the civilian use of nuclear 
technology, and many members of the peace movement were supporters of the 
Soviet Union. In Finland there have been three major influential peace groups. 
The oldest peace movement, the Peace Union of Finland (Suomen Rauhanliitto), 
has been a traditional Christian-liberal pacifism organization, emphasizing 
the importance of the role of the United Nations. The Peace Committee 
(Rauhanpuolustajat), a peace organization founded in 1949, was closely related to 
the Finnish Communists, and all of their actions were calculated from the point 
of having a good relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. The other 
peace group, The Committee of 100 (Sadankomitealiitto), was founded in 1963 
based on the real fear of a coming nuclear attack. Like the Peace Committee, it 
did not oppose civilian use of nuclear technology. In addition, the anti-nuclear 
peace movement was the subject of criticism by some politicians, who indicated 
that it was contrary to Finland’s public foreign policy and good relations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union (Litmanen 1998, 3-8). Politicians of the 
right, center, and left indirectly but almost universally condemned the protest 
movement.4 Ultimately, the anti-nuclear weapons movement in Finland did not 
become a strong force against civil use of nuclear energy.
After the Chernobyl disaster, however, Finland became strongly aware for 
the first time of the risk of utilizing nuclear power (Suhonen and Virtanen 1988, 
71). After the disaster, a Decision in Principle (DiP) concerning the construction 
of a new NPP was withdrawn.5 According to opinion polls, however, over 70 
percent of Finns felt the information was inadequate. It was said that there was 
a policy to intentionally avoid discussing the controversial approach on radio 
and TV (Findahl 1992, 135). In Sweden, all newspaper editorials seemed to 
support the government’s decision to close the nuclear plants, but in Finland, 
only 40 percent of newspaper editorials were critical of nuclear power (ibid., 142). 
Remarks that could arouse doubt about the NPP infrastructure’s connection with 
the Soviet Union rarely appeared in Finnish media; Finland’s information policy 
was instead featured as a problem (Rautio 2011, 10). Even so, the nuclear industry 
stagnated. The construction of the fifth reactor in the country did not occur 
as intended in September 1993 because of opposition in Parliament. However, 
around 1994, a new argument by nuclear advocates began to emerge that nuclear 
power was the only viable source of energy as a measure against climate change, 
especially compared to fossil fuels (Litmanen and Kojo 2011, 178).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transport of SNF from the NPP 
in Loviisa in Finland to Russia stopped. In addition to the dangers of railway 
transport accidents and terrorism, environmental pollution and the health 
hazards it presented to the neighboring residents of the Mayak reprocessing 
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facility near Chelyabinsk in Russia were condemned (Simes 1999, 259-261). 
International public opinion that nuclear waste should be disposed of in the 
country that generated it became louder, and the nuclear waste policy in Finland 
needed to be revised ahead of accession to the EC/EU (Sandberg 1999, 50-51). 
In 1994, the Finnish National Parliament revised the Atomic Energy Act to 
prohibit the export and import of HLW, deciding to dispose of it in Finland itself. 
Therefore, transportation of SNF to Russia ended in 1996. Thus, the international 
situation around Finland changed drastically. The siting of a repository also 
progressed rapidly. Until then, the repository siting plan was abandoned in 
some areas of Finland (Kojo 2006). In 1994, Eurajoki municipality withdrew 
an agreement that nuclear waste would not be disposed of there, and, in 1998, 
the “Olkiluoto Vision” was approved, including positive affirmation of the 
construction of a NPP in the municipality as well as a final disposal site for SNF 
(Kojo 2009, 176, 180).
Meanwhile, in West Germany, the book The Nuclear State by Robert Jungk 
was published in 1977 (Jungk 1977); people took notice of the opinion that 
nuclear power is a threat to democracy. In West Germany, with its Nazi past and 
strong emphasis on democracy, the book caused a sensation. Furthermore, with 
the rise of environmental awareness, nuclear power and environmental protection 
also became important issues. Around 1980 as Cold War tensions increased, 
a large-scale movement took place, the anti-nuclear movement increased 
drastically after the Chernobyl disaster, and reprocessing was abandoned in 1989, 
as mentioned above. After that, reprocessing was entrusted to France, but once 
HLW was transported to Germany after being reprocessed, it instigated the anti-
nuclear movement again.
Of course, before the reunification of East and West Germany, East Germany 
had NPPs introduced from the former Soviet Union and there was a SNF regime 
that was similar to that of Finland. However, after “unity,” when East Germany 
essentially joined West Germany, the “Western” national system basically took 
over. At that time, the population of East Germany was about one-quarter 
that of West Germany, East Germany’s economy fell into financial hardship, 
environmental pollution was remarkable, and NPPs in East Germany were shut 
down sequentially for not meeting West Germany’s safety standards. The nuclear 
policy of unified Germany as well as its values were primarily those of West 
Germany.
Conclusion
In this article, referring to the study by Högselius (2009), the historical 
background of Finnish radioactive waste disposal policy formation was analyzed 
through comparison with that of Germany.
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In West Germany after World War II, a U.S.-oriented foreign policy was 
adopted which was anti-Soviet and anti-communist. During the Cold War, 
the need for nuclear armament in West Germany for the defense of Europe 
was asserted by many major politicians and public disagreement over the 
NPT occurred. West Germany did not abandon reprocessing, a practice that 
was alleged to potentially lead to nuclear proliferation, until 1989. Meanwhile, 
however, the United States’ refusal to use reprocessing technology or fast breeder 
reactor technology encouraged the West German opposition campaign, and a 
large-scale anti-nuclear peace movement developed in Europe around the end 
of the 1970s. After the Chernobyl disaster, there were large protests that focused 
on reprocessing facilities, and since the 1990s, anti-nuclear movements against 
radioactive waste left over from reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France 
have been frequently reported.
Meanwhile, in Finland, under the strong but not definitive influence of the 
Soviet Union, the idea of the Nordic NWFZ was proposed, the choice to reprocess 
was abandoned as Cold War tensions increased around 1980, and direct disposal 
was adopted as the basic policy. When the anti-nuclear peace movement in 
Europe was at its largest, the movement in Finland was divided because Finland 
possessed NPPs from both the East and the West. After the Chernobyl disaster, 
the risk of nuclear power was strongly recognized by many Finnish people for the 
first time; however, domestic criticism was not directed towards NPPs but rather 
toward the domestic information policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the international situation surrounding Finland changed drastically and its 
problem-solving process regarding the final disposal of nuclear waste progressed 
rapidly. The absence of a strong nationwide anti-nuclear movement in Finland, 
against the backdrop of the Cold War, is one reason why Finland was the first 
nation in the world to decide upon a final disposal site plan. Other helpful factors 
for the adoption of direct disposal was that the amount of radioactive waste for 
which Finland should have taken responsibility was relatively low because about 
half of it had been commissioned to the former Soviet Union, direct disposal was 
less expensive than reprocessing, and reprocessing and radioactive waste were 
supervised by the major powers during the Cold War.
This study has concluded that the East-West confrontation during the 
Cold War affected the formation of radioactive waste disposal policy in Finland 
compared with that of (West) Germany. However, the considerations addressed 
in this article are only some of a multitude of complex and diverse factors.
In particular, in future research, the Finnish and German “technical 
culture” mentioned by Högselius (ibid.) should be analyzed. Even though a 
site for the repository of radioactive waste has been decided, this does not 
mean that it is a permanent solution. Humankind must coexist with its nuclear 




1.  In 2000, the coalition government of the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands) and the Green Party reached an agreement with a power company to 
phase out nuclear power. However, in 2010, the coalition government comprised of the 
CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in 
Bayern e. V.) and the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) extended the operation of NPPs 
by an average of twelve years, despite large scale of protests in Germany. The details of this 
development have been omitted due to space considerations.
2.  As symbolic incidents in the interference in Finnish affairs by the Soviet Union, the 
“Night Frost Crisis” in 1957 and the “Note Crisis” in 1962 should be pointed out. With 
regard to these, “Finlandization,” and politics, see Momose (1990).
3.  In Finland, the construction plan for reprocessing facilities did not actually progress, 
so it is not possible to compare how much influence views of reprocessing had on social 
attitudes between the Finnish and West German cases. However, due to the abandonment 
of reprocessing, it can be said that the related incentive to stimulate people’s fear of nuclear 
armament was absent in Finland.
4.  Email interview with Böök Mikael, a Finnish peace activist (August 29, 2017).
5.  The Decision in Principle (DiP) is Finland’s unique procedure wherein the 
government judges whether a plan benefits society as a whole, after which the plan is 
approved by the National Parliament.
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